ASPECTS OF LAW IN ANCIENT EGYPT

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Anyone who studies ancient Egyptian testimonies becomes quickly aware that the Egyptian society was quite consolidated at an early date. It was a highly developed, large-scale society with the king as its head. Most likely the organization of this society originated from the royal court and proceeded outwards through the various social subdivisions. By the middle of the third millennium at the latest, a centralized state formation was achieved. A highly organized administration was then created, including a treasury with its own taxation system; a judiciary with rigorous trial procedures was also at work. The purpose of this whole organization was to govern life in the Egyptian society through fixed norms.

In order to understand this legal order, (1) we must realize that the ideology of the time was a religiously determined whole. A society shaped by religion, as was the Egyptian, sees every aspect of the world, including its own social order, as under the sway of divine power, which establishes and maintains order. Hence among the Egyptians there arose a religious concept central to the appreciation of their legal order. This concept was called Maat; it may be rendered in English with "Order", "Justice", "Truth" etc.

In order to accommodate the religious world-view, this concept assumed a mythologically personified form. Indeed Maat was
represented anthropomorphically as a goddess of Order, Truth, and Justice. This goddess embraced not only the cosmic order, but also the entire realm of terrestrial life, where human affairs take place. Thus Maat became the divinity whose sole concern was with universal justice and order and to whom everyone was responsible for his deeds. The content of the concept Maat manifestly touched upon morality and ethics; in fact the entire legal order was bound up with this doctrine.

This was crucial for the Egyptian conception of monarchy, because the king, as son of the gods, had the task of defending Maat in the world. By virtue of his insight into the essence of Maat, the king knew what was right for the society. Accordingly the king was called upon to maintain and eventually restore order in the society, and consequently issue appropriate laws. Thus in Egypt the official legislation comprised not divinely revealed statutes, as is the case in Judaism and Islam, but laws which the king issued as needed.

Not only the king but all instruments of the state took Maat as their ruling principle, this means as the goal and duty of their official activity. Maat was, in other words, the embodiment of just administration. The bureaucracy and the judiciary were responsible for Maat, and thus for maintaining just order. This is illustrated by a trial record which, after giving the date of the proceedings, begins with the words: "May the court proceed according to the precepts of Maat".
The importance of Maat as a standard for just administration is also reflected in the fact that high officials and judges, including the vizier, wore an image of Maat on a neck chain as an emblem of their official activity. Among their titles was accordingly the designation "servant (or priest) of Maat".

Ultimately it was the task of all people to live in accord with Maat. After death each person was still held accountable as whether he had coped with this task. For life continued after death in a heavenly realm, provided that one succeeded in acquitting himself before the other-worldly judge. Under these circumstances one was vindicated before the other-worldly court only on the grounds of just behavior during one's life on earth.

From all this it appears that the law in Pharaonic Egypt was bound up with a religious world-view. Here Maat symbolized an ideal order, for which all people had to strive. So the vast domain of Maat governed all human activity as well, establishing an ethical frame of reference for every deed.

Maat subordinated the legal order to a broad concept of equity. As the Egyptian valued peace greatly, he held this doctrine in highest regard, and he always possessed an exceptional sense of justice. So very early on in Egypt the taking of the law into one's own hands lost validity. For Egyptian thinking the only admissible means of defending disputed rights was namely due process in court. Moreover the Egyptian, given his sense of justice and social responsibility, was inclined to champion not
just his own but also the legal rights of others. The record of one trial, for example, shows that a father took his own son to court, because the son had committed adultery. From another trial record we infer that a workman brought his co-worker to law for stealing tools from state property. In both cases it fell to an unimplicated individual to bring the unknown offence before the court. Already then we have in Egypt essentially cases of the volunteer prosecutor. The idea of enabling the volunteer to accuse at court the wrong-doer was introduced by Solon later in Athens for all citizens in connection with certain crimes. (4)

It is not our intent here to portray legal usage in Pharaonic Egypt simply as a pristine ideal. It is an academic question whether in some golden age the idea of justice in the society was perfectly realized. In fact what we know from the judicial praxis of the ancient Egyptians already indicates among other aspects legal transgressions and litigations in practically every area of daily life.

There are further connections between religion and law in Pharaonic Egypt. Indeed religion was never without great significance for the legal relations of people. This close relationship, we may even say interdependence, between religion and law manifests itself in one especially noteworthy consequence: since the gods were regarded as source and guardian of the right order, in doubtful cases they were consulted for the proper decision. Thus alongside the usual jurisdictional means, the
Egyptians employed a process of divine judgement, placing the omniscience of a divinity at the service of judicial proceedings. This practice was certainly based on the belief that the supernatural god champions the cause of justice.

Today we are pretty well informed concerning the trial procedures of the Egyptians, thanks to the corpus of texts which has reached us from the settlement of workmen at Deir-el-Medinah in West Thebes. In this settlement there lived, together with their families, the workmen who constructed and decorated the royal tombs at the end of the second millennium. Among these people, as in any other community, there were various conflicts and breaches of the law. A local court composed of the local dignitaries, normally judged over these matters. Here parties could have their rights determined or protect their causes, and also settle their disputes.

Our investigation has revealed that trial procedures in Deir-el-Medinah occurred in two distinct types. On the one hand, the ordinary court exercised what we call today civil and criminal jurisdiction: it could establish one's rights and even execute judgements of disputed legal relations; it could as well pronounce convictions of various offences. But there was also another type of trial. Here the ordinary court met, but above all a god was also summoned, who then as supreme judge issued his judgement on a given case. (This is in contrast to use of divine judgement in medieval Europe merely for the sake of corroboratory proof).
Our documentation is interspersed with reports of trials in which, remarkably, the divine judge settled disputed matters not arbitrarily, but on juridical grounds. For example, we know of a suit over a house, in which the god awarded the house to a man on the basis of a royal regulation. A royal ordinance, therefore, has served here as the legal ground for the judgement. Other trial records indicate the application of the current law of succession before the divine court. In precisely these cases the divine judge seems to have exercised no discretionary power; he was apparently bound by the ordinary norms of succession.

In general, then, this divine judgement process certainly reflected the normal one, which we may call the secular procedure. The essential difference between the two procedures appears to be solely that through the divine judgement process the legal decision, according to Egyptian belief, was pronounced not by a man but by a god. Here the god simply commanded what should apply to the case at hand. Now we may ask, why was a god consulted at all, when the usual legal rules should nevertheless apply? It would seem that the local court sometimes had its judgement be pronounced by an authoritative god in the expectation that the losing party in the suit would submit to divine will. This expectation is predicated upon the personal piety widespread at the time.

We have seen thus far how closely interrelated religion and law were in Pharaonic Egypt. Now a basic development in the course of Egyptian history was the emergence of law independently
from religion, in other words its secularisation. But this did not always mean the simple profaning of legal usage: in some cases the emergence of legal forms derived its impulse from religion itself. We find a good example of this in the creation in ancient Egypt of what we may call pious foundations.

A prominent motif in the Egyptian tomb decorations is the bringing of offering for the deceased. In fact the Egyptian was always concerned about his sustenance in the hereafter, because he expected to have a life after death much like his earthly existence. In this respect he resorted to magic and ritual in hopes of securing sustenance for himself in the afterworld; nevertheless he also depended upon the actual delivery of food at his tomb.

It was, of course, the duty of the family to provide food offerings for the dead. The Egyptian had a strong sense of this obligation and trusted in the pious loyalty of his survivors. There must have been cases, however, where this piety diminished, thus giving rise to doubts for the individual whether he would be properly provided for after his death. Gradually it became common to make arrangements already during one's own lifetime for continuing sustenance after death, enlisting the service of individual relatives, family retainers, and even outsiders. The individual bequeathed to these people fields or revenues, obliging them to present him funerary offerings, celebrate the required services, and maintain his tomb. Should
these individuals for any reason fail to meet the obligation, others were to succeed, fulfilling the funerary duties and receiving the same compensation. With his funerary services thus provided for from generation to generation, the endower was secure for ever.

In this way the foundation, as a permanently established juridical mechanism, was brought into being. As the religious and ethical injunction to care for the dead lost its force, a legal obligation was created in its place. We mean here foundation in the broader sense, in which an institution created by human intent has as its appointed purpose the fulfillment of an enduring goal. Two things are necessary to achieve this goal: first of all a lucrative property, which the endower cedes from his own property, and secondly, a lasting, that is to say, renewable, personal association, responsible for administration of the foundation's aims.

We get a fairly good idea of the expenditure which was devoted to such concerns from the tomb of the vizier Mereruka, one of the grandest and largest tombs at Saqqarah, dating from the end of the third millennium. It comprises no less than 32 rooms. 47 individuals of various ranks are named there; most of them must have been in some way connected with the tomb services to be performed for their master.

If we raise the question of the longevity of these foundations, we might presume that such individual private foundations
could not have endured very long. Consequently the founder sought to protect himself against a possible neglect of his endowed intent. He did so in quite a practical fashion, by enlisting the temple and its priesthood. Thus the continuing reliability of the funerary offerings was secured once and for all by their incorporation into the temple service, whose constancy was guaranteed. Reports from the middle of the third millennium onwards testify that the Egyptian increasingly entrusted his funerary rites to the priests.

We learn also from these reports that in some cases the king was registered above all as beneficiary of the foundation. This process is illustrated by the inscription of a high state official who established a pious foundation for his king (Amenophis III) in his temple at Memphis. He furnished the foundation with, among other things, fields, serfs and cattle.

The king, however, for his part, ceded to the endower the income from the foundation for the endower's grave, and the fulfillment of this provision was entrusted to the priests. The piety and loyalty of the endower to his king may have played here a role in his establishing this foundation. The legal historian, however, may also recognize in the incorporation of the king and priests an additional means of security for the survival of the foundation. Having placed the foundation under the charge, as it were, of the king and priests (counterparts of modern day trustees) the endower is assured that state and temple will guarantee the existence and function of the foundation.
From the foregoing we see how a juridical institution came into existence for the first time in our history, and how the Egyptian developed it further into an institution which still exists in our society of today. (8)

Law thus asserted its autonomy as early as the age of the pyramids, around the middle of the third millennium, while the role of religion in legal matters began to diminish. We are convinced of this by the surviving texts: legal transactions, trial minutes, temple archives, administrative documents, royal decrees, formulations for pious foundations, and so on. From this point on it was not religion which solely determined the legal standing of a matter, but rather the juridical mechanism which became determinative even in the religious sphere. The force of law found expression too in religious belief, as for example in the mythical conflict between Horus and Seth, where even the gods had to appear before a court in order to resolve their litigation. We should also recall the judgment of the dead before a court, which occupied a prominent place in the Egyptian conception of the afterworld.

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The evidence of the texts which we have considered thus far would rather indicate an empirically obtained law, based simply upon the facts of experience. But now we want to return our attention to the texts from the workmen's settlement at Deir-el-Mединah. This abundant material has greatly enriched our
knowledge of various aspects of the law during the 13th and 12th centuries. This material shows that by this time law had not yet fully emerged as a distinct sphere of social life, nor had the understanding of law advanced completely to conceptual clarity. Nonetheless there is evidence here of some initial steps toward dogmatic thinking.

The settlement dwellers were definitely capable of resolving their conflicts and defending their rights with a variety of means. Yet there is no definite hint in our evidence that one was accustomed to take the law into his own hands.

Obviously there was no state sanction allowing individual self-help. For these people the only admissible way of defending disputed rights or property was trial before the local court. This court, composed of local dignitaries, ruled on every sort of case. From a systematic point of view, we would say that the local court presided over cases which could be classified today as both civil and penal. In other words, the local court was called upon to pass judgment not only on litigations among the inhabitants, but also on offences which they committed such as theft, adultery, defamation, bodily injury, and so on. Besides this, the court could act as an executory power with a variety of means of coercion. In short, the court could in certain situations exercise the power of distraint over the property of a debtor, as well as physical force against the body of a citizen.

The surviving trial minutes from Deir-el-Medina indicate that some trials ended with the swearing of an oath by the losing
party at the order of the court. In so-called civil cases the defendant swore to pay his debt or meet his obligation to the opponent as soon as possible. In so-called criminal cases he promised to cease his illegal conduct in the future. In many cases, however, the court was not content with such a promise alone. The defendant was moreover required formally to acknowledge a penalty consisting of a bodily punishment, to be inflicted in case he did not keep his promise.

If we look carefully at these penalties, we see a distinction in the case of criminal offences. Often in civil cases the losing party promises to pay his debt to the opponent as soon as possible; otherwise he incurs a bastinado, or thrashing; typically of 100 blows. For criminal offenders, however, a more severe corporal punishment comes into question. In a slander trial for example, the required penalty for a repeated offence was mutilation of the nose and ears. This punishment as well as impalement were imposed as penalty against a person convicted of disturbing the peace of a dead person in his tomb. In another trial concerning a similar offence one spoke of bastinado and infliction of five wounds. The penalty called forth for adultery was mutilation of the nose and ears as well as exile to Nubia, or exile combined with forced labor.

Thus the court seems to have distinguished between civil disputes among citizens, on the one hand, and criminal offences on the other. Only so can we explain the material distinction made with regard to penalties in these cases. Such a distinction must reflect the emerging awareness that certain transgressions offended the entire community and therefore should be requited.
more severely by the public order. By all appearances therefore, the categorical distinction of criminal cases from matters of civil dispute seems to have occurred for the first time in history, if we are not mistaken, in Egypt.(9)

Judging from the textual material which survives from Pharaonic times, the Egyptian had seemingly no conception of jurisprudence as a discipline, in the strict sense of the word, theoretical deliberation as the basis of substantive law being not attested for this period. Yet a papyrus has unexpectedly come to light which shows clearly that the consideration of particular legal question in isolation as well as the abstract elaboration of legal norms was known to the Egyptians. The papyrus under discussion comes from Hermopolis and can be assigned to the first half of the third century B.C. It is about 2 meters long. For the present we are concerned with the recto of this unique text, containing 305 preserved lines of demotic script. It has in fact a very unusual content, precisely legal theoretical discussion, which can be easily divided into approximately 200 articles, grouped into four sections.(10)

The first section deals with tenant farming arrangements as well as disputes which can arise between the tenant farmer and the lessor. The following article can be taken as an example: (Col.II , 10–11) "If a person takes a field on lease, in order to
cultivate it, and the lessor gives him the seed-corn; but the field receives no water, due to (drought) in the year in question, they do not ordinarily oblige him to render the harvest (payment). Ordinarily they require (only) that he return the seed-corn."

In addition to treating such questions the text contains contract formulae, which are to serve as patterns, also arrangements to be made by, for example, the purchaser of a house in order to safeguard his interests against an unfair seller. Aside from this, rental agreements for various types of buildings are described, as well as litigations which can arise due to nonpayment of rent.

The papyrus treats in detail the so-called alimentation agreement (s^n3n). This is a type of marriage settlement, under which the woman cedes to the man a considerable amount of capital. He in turn guarantees to her a determined amount of maintenance support. Our papyrus does not discuss the settlement as such, which we know from numerous marriage documents; it treats rather disputed issues which can arise between husband and father-in-law due to failure to honor such an agreement.

Hereafter follow cases concerning real estate. Here is an example: An individual has built a house on a plot of land. Later, the title to the land is claimed by someone else. At this point the text describes the procedures to be followed in order to settle the conflict (Col. VI, 3 ff.)
Next, the text treats various disputes among neighbours. The following is typical: (Col. VIII, 19-20) "If a man brings action against (another) man saying: 'He has opened the entrance of his house (facing) my plot'; if it is the case that the defendant has no claim to the (neighbouring plot), then ordinarily they seal the entrance completely."

The final paragraphs in our papyrus deal with the law of succession, especially the position of the eldest son in disputed cases, as well as various actions regarding inheritance.

The text of this papyrus evidently reflects issues which came up frequently in everyday life. Incidentally it contains no punitive sanctions directed against the human body, with the sole exception of a bastinado in the case of someone who, unauthorized, erects a building without awaiting an official approval. We know, by way of documents contemporary to the papyrus, that all the questions treated in the text are cases pertaining to everyday life. The dates and formulae used in the text also agree with those known from other sources for this period. Moreover the text mentions here and there procedures for the assessment of evidence, on the basis of which the judge can decide a case. The types of admitted evidence mentioned here, such as oaths, entries in the official register, judicial inspection, etc., are known to us too from contemporary texts. In short, one can recognize at first glance in our papyrus such legal conditions as commonly existed in Egypt at the beginning of the Hellenistic period.
If we look closer at the text, we readily notice that it discusses only questions concerning the property of private persons, whereas matters of penal law are left out of consideration. Evidently the author has aimed to define legal norms for the relations of private persons with respect to their property and the exchange thereof. He was interested, in other words, mainly in the ownership rights of the individual, that is, the means by which an individual can protect his rights in order to acquire property and keep it in peace.

With this intent the author classified the pertinent formulations in sections according to content. So leases of arable land are dealt with in one section, problems of inheritance in a second, litigations among neighbours in a third, and so on, with pertinent subdivisions also within the various sections. No doubt this arrangement of the material indicates an author who knew very well how to treat legal questions systematically, even if his arrangement does not entirely correspond to ours today.

In order to discuss the issues at hand the author has conceived theoretical disputes and situations, designed for guidance in the judgement of any number of actual cases. He has made use too of a repertoire of stock definitions, for example paraphrases for the concepts we designate today as "plaintiff", "defendant", etc. The author also makes use of abstract concepts, for example he uses the concept of "things" (nkt), just as later a Roman jurist applies the category of res.
From all this it is clear that the author of our text was a true jurisprudent, capable of creating a juristic work. For many scholars today this conclusion is more significant for the study of legal history than if we had received from Pharaonic Egypt a corpus such as the law code of Hammurapi. Earlier it was doubted whether there were in ancient Egypt scholars who could be qualified as jurists in the strict sense of the word; but today their existence is undisputed. Our author, who was perhaps learned in the law by profession, certainly vouches for the existence of many generations of jurists in Pharaonic Egypt.

The character of his text, however, remains problematic. Is it to be regarded as a collection of practical legal cases, ultimately based on common law? Or should we see the text, as some scholars do, simply as a lemmatic commentary by a jurisprudent, probably in reference to a pre-existing law code? Others take the text as a handbook of sorts, perhaps a reference work for specific areas of law. To date there has been no consensus on this question.

It is evident that this law book was not intended for local use. Since 1978 we have namely had proof, in the form of two papyrus fragments from Oxyrhynchus, corresponding fairly closely to certain passages in our text, that a Greek translation of the law book existed. This Greek papyrus appears to have been written in the second half of the second century A.D. The translation, however, was probably made at the beginning of the Hellenistic era. This means that both the Greek translation and our demotic law book are to be attributed to the same period.
The Greek version, nevertheless, is not a word for word translation. There are indeed material differences between the two texts. Thus the Greek translation must have been made on the basis of a different demotic original. This means, then, that there were several copies of the demotic law book in existence at the same time; they were not, however, identical. Therefore we assume that already by the beginning of the Hellenistic era several such law books existed, circulating throughout the entire land.

This assumption is well confirmed by another demotic papyrus. It is a legal theoretical treatment, in précis form, of the certification of a legal transaction along with the eventual submission or nonsubmission of documents to the contracting parties. According to the papyrus certain contractual relations between private individuals are meant to be regulated through documentation; after the event the two parties enter eventually into dispute: one asserts that, although he has made the expected payment, he has not received from the other party the document necessary to establish his credit. This papyrus was composed toward the end of the second century B.C., presumably in Hermopolis. With its estimated length of approximately 4 meters the papyrus probably contains only an abstract from a much larger juridical work. The other parts of this work must have been written in other papyri which we do not possess today.

Another demotic papyrus, form Tebtynis, has been recently published. This text has close affinities to our law book from Hermopolis (dating from the beginning of the Hellenistic period), although it too contains divergencies and additions. This papyrus is assigned to
the time between the end of the Hellenistic period and the begin-
nning of Roman rule.

Thus there appears to have existed a number of Egyptian law books, of somewhat varied contents, stemming from a variety of times and places. We might venture therefore the hypothesis that all these texts descended from a single original. The archetype text would have ultimately derived from the time of the Persian emperor Darius I. This hypothesis, appealing as it is, is not wholly tenable, however, especially because apart from one historical report no concrete evidence is forthcoming from the time of Darius I.

Returning to our law book from Hermopolis, and looking closely at some formulations in the text, such as dating formulae, we can detect archaic or archaizing elements. Harvest time, for example, is mentioned several times in the text. But the harvest time cited here (May-June) does not correspond to that of the calendar in use during the third century B.C., when the text was transcribed. At that time, as is well known, a fluctuating calendar was in use. The harvest time mentioned in the papyrus corresponds rather to the calendar of the eighth century B.C. Consequently we assume that the relevant paragraphs were taken from a much older manuscript, in which were reflected the conditions of the eighth century. Several other features of the text also lead to the same conclusion. Thus the Hermopolis law book must contain portions of a variety of texts from different periods, all having been reworked by a jurist of the third century B.C.
This realization leads us necessarily to consult legal documents from earlier periods, expecting that portions of the papyrus can be brought into connection with earlier sources. We have, for example, minutes from a trial in the twelfth century B.C. whose contents can be compared productively to certain passages from our law book.

In the Hermopolis law book (Col.VII, 7-10) there is discussion of a dispute over a house which collapsed due to flooding, but which was later reconstructed by someone other than the original owner. For such a case the law book provides a procedure, with the basic idea that the house should be granted to the one who rebuilt it, even if by inheritance it properly belongs to someone else. The trial minutes from the twelfth century likewise deal with a similar case. There the court has granted a house, which had collapsed, to a man who restored it. In so doing the court refers to a regulation of the king, who must have decreed that someone who rebuilds a destroyed house may keep it as his own property.

This royal ordinance was essentially a concrete statute for such types of disputes. The very statute appears in the third-century law book from Hermopolis, because the author proceeds from this ruling in his discussion of similar cases. He obviously uses this particular statute as the legal ground for his own determination, however without saying so explicitly. We may presume therefore that the author proceeded analogously in his treatment of other
cases as well. In other words, he seems to have reworked among other things laws of earlier kings from the Pharaonic times and used them as the basis of his own decisions. Several papyri show us indeed that laws from Pharaonic times were still valid at the beginning of the Hellenistic era. The policies of the Ptolemaic rulers also point in this direction. These rulers, above all Ptolemy II issued many regulations concerning administration and finances, but they allowed the Egyptian population to continue living according to the old accepted Pharaonic laws.

The demotic papyri which have been considered above certainly do not derive from a pre-scientific stage of development. In these documents Egyptian jurists have treated legal material systematically; in so doing they clearly followed a relevant principle of organisation, with thoroughgoing subdivisions in each category. We see here a definite deepening of juristic thought as well, the point of departure for law as a rigorous scientific discipline. Here begins genuine jurisprudence. (15)

The classical authors too write respectfully of law and justice among the ancient Egyptians. Moreover we know that certain Greek lawmakers (Solon for sure, perhaps also Plato, and many others) traveled to Egypt in order to study, among other subjects, Egyptian law. The Persian king Darius I is also said to have held Egyptian law in high esteem and to have occupied himself with it extensively. Hence the universal history of law, which was to play itself out over the course of millennia in the Mediterranean basin, begins with Egypt. In fact the contribution of Pharaonic Egypt to the evolution of law remains significant to this day.
Notes


4. Lexikon der Ägyptologie (= LÄ), V, s.v. Recht.


(Preface, Additional Notes and Glossary by G. Hughes),
(Le Caire 1975); cf. S. Grunert, Der Kodex Hermopolis (und
ausgewählte private Rechtsurkunden aus dem ptolemäischen
Ägypten), (Leipzig 1982).

11. For recent studies of this so-called Zivilprozessordnung see
E. Seidl, in: Recueils de la Société J. Bodin pour l'Histoire
comparative des institutions vol. 16 (Bruxelles 1965), 43ff;
T. Mursich, in: Gedächtnisschrift für W. Kunkel (Frankfurt,
1984), 205 ff.

12. E. Bresciani, 'Frammenti da un 'Prontuario legale' demotico

13. Mélèze-Modrzejewski, 'Livres sacrés et justice lagide', in:
Symbolae C. Kunderewicz (Acta Universitatis Lodziensis –

14. P. Pestman, 'L'origine et l'extension d'un manuel de droit
égyptien', in: Journal of the Economic and Social History of
the Orient vol. 26 (1983), 14ff.

15. For further details see my article 'Réflexions sur le "Code
Légal" d'Hermopolis dans l'Egypte ancienne', in: Chronique
d'Egypte vol. 61 (1986), 50ff.